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Are large complex economic systems unstable ?
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Although classical economic theory is based on the concept of stable equilibrium, real economic
systems appear to be always out of equilibrium. Indeed, they share many of the dynamical features
of other complex systems, e.g., ecological food-webs. We focus on the relation between increasing
complexity of the economic network and its stability with respect to small perturbations in the
dynamical variables associated with the constituent nodes. Inherent delays and multiple time-
scales suggest that economic systems will be more likely to exhibit instabilities as their complexity
is increased even though the speed at which transactions are conducted has increased many-fold
through technological developments. Analogous to the birth of nonlinear dynamics from Poincare’s
work on the question of whether the solar system is stable, we suggest that similar theoretical
developments may arise from efforts by econophysicists to understand the mechanisms by which
instabilities arise in the economy.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh,05.65.+b,89.75.Da,05.40.Fb
Is the global economic system of the present era in-
herently unstable? It had long been thought that the
cyclical sequence of inflations and recessions that have
buffeted most national economies throughout the 19th
and 20th centuries are an inevitable result of modern
industrial capitalism. However, starting in the 1970s,
economists allied with the influential Chicago school of
economics started to promote the belief that the panacea
to all economic ills of the world lay in completely and
unconditionally subscribing to their particular brand of
free-market policies. Their hubris reached its apogee at
the beginning of this decade as summed up by the state-
ment of the Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas at the 2003 an-
nual meeting of the American Economic Association that
“the central problem of depression prevention has been
solved, for all practical purposes” [1]. This complacency
about the economy’s robustness to all possible perturba-
tions led not only most professional economists, but more
importantly, government bureaucrats and ministers (e.g.,
Gordon Brown’s claims that economic booms and busts
were a thing of the past [2]) to ignore or downplay the
seriousness of the present economic and financial crisis at
its initial stage. As many of the recent books on the onset
of the global economic meltdown written by Posner and
others point out, the mainstream economists and those
whom they advised were blinded by their unquestioning
acceptance of the assumptions of neo-classical theory [3].
In response to the rising criticism of traditional
economic theory, spearheaded by physicists working
on economic phenomena [4] as well as non-traditional
economists who have collaborated with physicists [5],
some economists are now trying to put up a defense that
the sudden collapse of markets and banks is not some-
thing that can be predicted by economic theory as this
contradicts their basic foundational principles of ratio-
nal expectations and efficient markets. Thus, accord-
ing to the conventional economic school of thought, bub-
bles cannot exist because any rise in price must reflect
all information available about the underlying asset [6].
Although detailed analysis of data from markets clearly
reveals that much of the observed price variation can-
not be explained in terms of changes in economic fun-
damentals [7], the unquestioning belief in the perfection
of markets has prompted several economists in the past
decades to assert that the famous historical bubbles, such
as Tulipomania in 17th century Holland or the South
Sea Affair of 18th century England, were not episodes
of price rise driven by irrational speculation, but rather
were based on sound economic reasons (see, e.g., Ref. [8]).
This complete divorce of theory from observations points
to the basic malaise of economics. What makes it all
the more worrying is that despite the lack of any empiri-
cal verification, such economic theories have nevertheless
been used to guide the policies of national and inter-
national agencies affecting the well-being of billions of
human beings.
In fact, in its desperate effort to become a rigorous sci-
ence by adopting, among other things, the formal math-
ematical framework of game theory, mainstream eco-
nomics has become concerned less with describing re-
ality than with an idealized version of the world. As
an economist recently pointed out, in the overly math-
ematical formalism of rational expectations theory, any
economic transaction, including that of a person buy-
ing a newspaper from the corner store vendor, appears
to be a complicated chess game between Kenneth Ar-
row and Paul Samuelson, two of the most notable post-
war economists (quoted in Ref. [9]). In truth, almost
throughout our life, we rarely go through a complicated
optimization process in an effort to calculate the best
course of action. Even if we had access to complete in-
formation about all the options available (which is seldom
the case), the complexity of the computational problem
may overwhelm our decision-making capabilities. Thus,
most often we are satisfied with choices that seem “good
enough” to us, rather than the best one under all pos-
2sible circumstances. Moreover, our choices may also re-
flect non-economic factors such as moral values that are
usually not taken into consideration in mainstream eco-
nomics.
Given these caveats, it seems that the cherished hy-
potheses of efficient markets and rational agents stands
on very shaky ground indeed. The question obviously
arises as to whether there are any alternative founda-
tions that can replace the neo-classical framework. Be-
havioral economics, which tries to integrate the areas
of psychology, sociology and economics, is one possible
candidate. Another challenger is from outside the tradi-
tional boundaries of economics, a discipline that has been
dubbed econophysics [10, 11]. Although physicists have
earlier worked on economic problems occasionally, it was
only about a decade and half ago that a systematic, con-
certed movement began which has seen more and more
physicists using the tools of their trade to analyze phe-
nomena occurring in a socio-economic context [12]. This
was partly driven by the availability of large quantities of
high-quality data and the means to analyze them using
computationally intensive algorithms. One of the most
active sub-fields within this area is the empirical char-
acterization of statistical properties of financial markets.
Starting from the work of Mantegna and Stanley [13],
several important results are now known about such mar-
kets which appear to be universal, in the sense that they
are invariant with respect to the systems being consid-
ered, the time-period under consideration and the type
of data being analyzed. One of the best examples of
such universal features of financial markets is the inverse
cubic law for the distribution of price (or index) fluctua-
tions [14]. Not only has it been observed to hold across
several different time-scales and across different types of
stocks (and market indices), but more surprisingly, it ap-
pears to be valid irrespective of the stage of development
of the market [15].
Financial markets have also proved a fertile ground for
uncovering the structure of interactions between the dif-
ferent components of an economic system. In particular,
the transactions between agents buying and selling dif-
ferent stocks in the market are reflected in the correlated
movements of the prices of different stocks. Analogous to
the process of inferring the movement of air molecules by
watching the Brownian motion of suspended particles, we
can have a coarse-grained view of the interaction dynam-
ics between individuals in the market by reconstructing
the network of significantly correlated stocks (i.e., corre-
lated in terms of their price fluctuations). Comparison
of such stock interaction networks for different markets
has hinted that a financial market at a later stage of de-
velopment possesses many more strongly bound clusters
of co-moving stocks that are often from the same busi-
ness sector [16]. As such markets tend to have identical
statistical properties in terms of the distributions of price
or index fluctuations, as well as, other trading indicators,
FIG. 1: Price mechanism leading to stable equilibrium
between supply and demand according to traditional
economic thinking. (Left) The supply and demand curves
indicate how increasing supply or decreasing demand can re-
sult in falling price or vice versa. If the available supply of a
certain good in the market at any given time is less than its
demand for it among consumers, its price will go up. The per-
ceived shortage will stimulate increase in production that will
result in an enhanced supply. However, if supply increases
beyond the point where it just balances the demand at that
time, there will be unsold stock remaining which will eventu-
ally push the price down. This in turn will result in a decrease
in the production. Thus, a negative feedback control mecha-
nism governed by price will move demand and supply along
their respective curves to the mutual point of intersection,
where the quantity available (Q0) at the equilibrium price P0
is such that supply exactly equals demand. (Right) As the
demand and supply of a product changes over time due to
various different factors, the supply and demand curves may
shift on the quantity-price space. As a result, the new equi-
librium will be at a different price (P ′0) and quantity (Q
′
0).
Until the curves shift again, this equilibrium will be stable,
i.e., any perturbation in demand or supply will quickly decay
and the system will return to the equilibrium.
they differ primarily in the topological structure of the
interactions between their components. Thus, network
analysis can provide us with a window into the process
of economic development.
When we broaden our problem from the relatively
restricted context of financial markets to general eco-
nomic phenomena, the role played by networks of in-
teractions become even more intriguing. Traditionally,
economics has been concerned primarily with equilibria.
Fig. 1 shows that the price mechanism was perceived by
economists to introduce a negative feedback between per-
turbations in demand and supply, so that the system
quickly settles to the equilibrium where supply exactly
equals demand. Much of the pioneering work of Samuel-
son [17], Arrow [18] and others (for a review see Ref. [19])
had been involved with demonstrating that such equi-
libria can be stable, subject to several restrictive condi-
tions. However, the occurrence of complex networks of
interactions in reality bring new dynamical issues to fore.
Most notably, we are faced with the question: do com-
plex economic networks give rise to instabilities ? Given
that most economic systems at present are composed of
3numerous strongly connected components, will periodic
and chaotic behavior be the norm for such systems rather
than static equilibrium solutions ?
This question has, of course, been asked earlier in
different contexts. In ecology, it has given rise to the
long-standing stability-diversity debate [20]. In the net-
work framework, the ecosystem can be thought of as a
network of species, each of the nodes being associated
with a variable that corresponds to the population of the
species it represents. The stability of the ecosystem is
then defined by the rate at which small perturbations to
the populations of various species decay with time. If
the disturbance instead grows and gradually propagates
through the system affecting other nodes, the equilibrium
is clearly unstable. Prior to the pioneering work of May
in the 1970s, it was thought that increasing complexity of
an ecosystem, either in terms of a rise in the total num-
ber of species or the density and strength of their con-
nections, results in enhanced stability of the ecosystem.
This belief was based on empirical observations that more
diverse food-webs (e.g., in the wild) showed less violent
fluctuations in population density than simpler commu-
nities (such as in fields under monoculture) and were less
likely to suffer species extinctions. It has also been seen
that tropical forests, which generally tend to be more di-
verse than sub-tropical ones, are also more resistant to
invasion by foreign species [21]. It was therefore nothing
short of a shock to the field when in 1972, Robert May
showed in the very brief article Will a large complex sys-
tem be stable? [22] using linear stability arguments that
as complexity increases, a randomly connected network
would tend to become more and more unstable.
The surprising demonstration that a system which has
many elements and/or dense connections between its el-
ements is actually more likely to suffer potentially dam-
aging large fluctuations initiated by small perturbations
immediately led to a large body of work on this problem
(see Ref. [23] for a review). The two major objections
to May’s results were (a) it uses linear stability analysis
and that (b) it assumed random organization of the inter-
action structure. However, more recent work which con-
sider systems with different types of population dynamics
in the nodes, including periodic limit-cycles and chaotic
attractors [24, 25], as well as, networks having realistic
features such as clustered small-world property [26] and
scale-free degree distribution [27], have shown the result
of increasing instability of complex networks to be ex-
tremely robust. While large complex networks can still
arise as a result of gradual evolution [28], it is almost in-
evitable that such systems will be frequently subject to
large fluctuations and extinctions.
The relevance of this body of work to understanding
the dynamics of economic systems has been highlighted
in the wake of the recent banking crisis when a series of
defaults, following each other in a cascading process, led
to the collapse of several major financial institutions. In
fact, May and two other theoretical ecologists have writ-
ten an article entitled Ecology for bankers [29] to point
out the strong parallels between understanding collapse
in economic and ecological networks. Recent empirical
determination of networks occurring in the financial con-
text, such as that of inter-bank payment flows between
banks through the Fedwire real-time settlement service
run by the US Federal Reserve, has now made it possible
to analyze the process by which cascades of failure events
can occur in such systems [30]. Analogous to ecological
systems, where population fluctuations of a single species
can trigger diverging deviations from the equilibrium in
the populations of other species, congestion in settling
the payment of one bank can cause other pending set-
tlements to accumulate rapidly setting up the stage for
a potential major failure event. It is intriguing that it
is the very complexity of the network that has made it
susceptible to such network propagated effects of local
deviations which makes global or network-wide failure
even more likely. As the world banking system becomes
more and more connected, it may be very valuable to un-
derstand how the topology of interactions can affect the
robustness of the network.
The economic relevance of the network stability argu-
ments used in the ecological context can be illustrated
from the following toy example. Consider a model finan-
cial market comprising N agents where each agent can
either buy or sell at a given time instant. This tendency
can be quantitatively measured by the probability to buy,
p, and its complement, the probability to sell, 1− p. For
the market to be in equilibrium, the demand should equal
supply, so that as many agents are likely to buy as to sell,
i.e., p = 0.5. Let us in addition consider that agents are
influenced in their decision to buy or sell by the actions
of other agents with whom they have interactions. In
general, we can consider that out of all possible pairwise
interactions between agents only a fraction C are actu-
ally realized. In other words, the inter-agent connections
are characterized by the matrix of link strengths J={Jij}
(where i, j = 1, ..., N label the agents) with a fraction C
of non-zero entries. If Jij > 0, it implies that an action
of agent j (buying or selling) is likely to influence agent i
to act in the same manner, whereas Jij < 0 suggests that
the action of i will be contrary to that of j. Thus, the
time-evolution of the probability for agent i to buy can
be described by the following linearized equation close to
the equilibrium pi = 0.5(i = 1, . . . , N):
dpi
dt
= ǫi(0.5− pi) + ΣjJij(0.5− pj), (1)
where ǫi is the rate of converge of an isolated node to
its equilibrium state of equal probability for buying or
selling. Without much loss of generality we can consider
ǫi = 1 by appropriate choice of time units for the dy-
namics. If in addition, we consider that for simplicity the
interactions are assigned randomly from a Gaussian dis-
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FIG. 2: Delay in market response can result in persis-
tent price oscillations. Ideally the price mechanism should
result in a transient increase (decrease) in demand to be im-
mediately matched by a corresponding increase (decrease) in
supply. However, in reality there is delay in the information
about the rise or fall in demand reaching the producer; more-
over, at the production end it may take time to respond to
the increasing demand owing to inherent delays in the pro-
duction system. Thus, the supply may always lag behind the
price in a manner that produces oscillations: as price rises,
supply initially remains low before finally increasing, by which
time demand has fallen due to the high price which (in as-
sociation with the increased supply) brings the price down.
Supply continues to rise for some more time before starting
to decrease. When it falls much lower than the demand, the
price starts rising again which starts the whole cycle anew.
Thus, if the demand fluctuates at a time-scale that is shorter
than the delay involved in adjusting the production process
to respond to variations in demand, the price may evolve in
a periodic or even a chaotic manner.
tribution with mean 0 and variance σ2, then the largest
eigenvalue of the corresponding Jacobian matrix J eval-
uated around the equilibrium is λmax =
√
NCσ2 − 1.
For system parameters such that NCσ2 > 1, an initially
small perturbation will gradually grow with time and
drive the system away from its equilibrium state. Thus,
even though the equilibrium p = 0.5 is stable for indi-
vidual nodes in isolation, it may become unstable under
certain conditions when interactions between the agents
are introduced. Note that the argument can be easily
generalized to the case where the distribution from which
Jij is chosen has a non-zero mean.
Another problem associated with the classical concept
of economic equilibrium is the process by which the sys-
tem approaches it. Walras, in his original formulation of
how prices achieve their equilibrium value had envisioned
the taˆtonnement process by which a market-maker takes
in buy/sell bids from all agents in market and gradu-
ally adjusts price until demand equals supply. Formally,
it resembles an iterative convergence procedure for de-
termining the fixed-point solution of a set of dynamical
equations. However, as we know from the developments
in nonlinear dynamics over the past few decades, such
operations on even simple non-linear systems (e.g., the
logistic equation) can result in periodic cycles or even
chaos [31]. It is therefore not surprising to consider a sit-
uation in which the price mechanism can actually result
in supply and demand to be forever out of step each other
even though each is trying to respond to changes in the
other. A simple situation in which such a scenario can
occur is shown in Fig. 2, where a delay in the response
of the supply to the changes in price through variations
in demand can cause persistent oscillations.
As the principal reason for the instability appears to be
the delay, one can argue that by increasing the speed of
information propagation it should be possible to stabilize
the equilibrium. However, we seem to have witnessed ex-
actly the reverse with markets becoming more volatile as
improvements in communication enable economic trans-
actions to be conducted faster and faster. As a history
of financial manias and panics points out, “there is lit-
tle historical evidence to suggest that improvements in
communications create docile financial markets . . . ” [32].
A possible answer to this apparent paradox lies in the
fact that in any realistic economic situation, informa-
tion about fluctuations in the demand may require to be
relayed through several intermediaries before it reaches
the supplier. In other situations, the market may be seg-
mented into several communities of agents, with signifi-
cantly more interactions occurring between agents within
the same as opposed to different communities. These fea-
tures can introduce several levels of delays in the market,
resulting in a multiple time-scale problem [33]. Thus, in-
creasing the speed of transactions, while ostensibly allow-
ing faster communication at the global scale can disrupt
the dynamical separation between process operating at
different time-scales. This can prevent sub-systems from
converging to their respective equilibria before subject-
ing them to new perturbations, thereby always keeping
the system out of equilibrium.
Therefore, we see that far from conforming to the neo-
classical ideal of a stable equilibrium, the dynamics of
the economic system is likely to be always far from equi-
librium. In analogy with the question asked about eco-
logical and other systems with many diverse interacting
components, we can ask whether a sufficiently complex
economy is bound to exhibit instabilities. After all, just
like the neo-classical economists, natural scientists also at
one time believed in the clockwork nature of the physical
world (which in turn influenced the the English philoso-
pher, Thomas Hobbes, to seek the laws for social orga-
nization). However, Poincare’s work on the question of
whether the solar system is stable showed the inherent
problems with such a viewpoint and eventually paved the
way for the later developments of chaos theory. Possibly
we are at the brink of a similar theoretical breakthrough
in econophysics, one that does not strive to re-interpret
(or even ignore) empirical data so as to conform to a the-
orist’s expectations but one which describes the mecha-
nisms by which economic systems actually evolve over
time. It may turn out that, far from failures of the mar-
ket that need to be avoided, crashes and depressions may
5be the necessary ingredients of future developments, as
has been suggested by Schumpeter in his theory of cre-
ative destruction [34]. However, most importantly, we
should not forget that economic phenomena form just
one aspect of the entire set of processes that make up
the human social organization. Econophysics has to ul-
timately strive to be a theory for the entire spectrum of
human social behavior. As Keynes, one of the greatest
economists, had once said “do not let us overestimate the
importance of the economic problem, or sacrifice to its
supposed necessities other matters of greater and more
permanent significance” [35].
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